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1 
UNITED STATES V. LILLY: FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Both federal and state governments have a vested interest in 
prosecuting individuals who commit crimes. The justice system allows 
the government to hold these individuals accountable for their actions 
and repay a debt owed to society. To achieve this result, the government 
may secure a conviction with the testimony of individuals who witnessed 
a defendant’s criminal act. These prosecution witnesses interact with the 
justice system through prosecutors and also through law enforcement. 
While this interaction benefits the government, it creates issues 
when a prosecution witness also commits a criminal act. Her testimony, 
potentially essential to the case against another individual, may also 
implicate her in a crime. She may be vaguely aware of her constitutional 
protection against self-incrimination, but this notion does not protect her 
from enticing recommendations by law enforcement. These 
recommendations, which seem to convey promises of immunity from 
prosecution, arguably compel her to make incriminatory statements 
while providing law enforcement with valuable information in another 
case. Her statements thus lead to her arrest and prosecution. 
Such was the fate for the defendant in United States v. Lilly.1 The 
Tenth Circuit upheld Ms. Lilly’s conviction because of the broad rule 
and narrow exception related to promises of immunity made by the 
federal government. This article explores that rule and its exception, 
ultimately arguing for a change in application to better protect Fifth 
Amendment privilege. Rather than examining prosecution witness 
immunity through prosecutorial misconduct 2  or judicial supervisory 
powers, 3  this article takes a novel approach and examines federal 
prosecution witness immunity in the context of a federal government 
entity’s actual authority to promise immunity. 4  This rule, often 
analogized to the concept of promissory estoppel in contract law, 
implicates much greater stakes than those typically surrounding contract 
disputes. Despite the serious nature of the rights at stake, including 
liberty and even life, the extremely narrow exception to the actual 
 
 
1 810 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2016). 
2 E.g., Nathaniel Lipanovich, Resolving the Circuit Split on Defense Witness Immunity: How the 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Test Has Failed Defendants and What the Supreme Court Should Do 
About It, 91 TEX. L. REV. 175, 175 (2012).  
3 E.g., Lilly, 810 F.3d at 1218; Alison M. Field, Note, Defense Witnesses Need Immunity Too: Why 
the Supreme Court Should Adopt the Ninth Circuit's Approach to Defense-Witness Immunity, 49 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 231, 233 (2015). 
4 This article focuses on the actual authority of government entities related to immunity from federal 
prosecution. Additionally, the discussion focuses on witnesses for the prosecution.  
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authority rule5 fails to provide adequate protection reflective of these 
important rights. 
Too inflexible to account for these rights, the actual authority rule 
becomes overly broad and harshly objective. Courts construe the only 
exception to this rule so narrowly as to make it fundamentally 
unavailable.6 The current state of the rule, as demonstrated in Lilly, may 
require prosecution witnesses to choose either to help the government 
build a case against another individual or to protect her own interest 
against self-incrimination. A solution to such a difficult choice may lie in 
the framework set out in Miranda v. Arizona.7 In this manner, law 
enforcement agents should be legally required to affirmatively disclose 
whether they can grant immunity to potential witnesses. As applied to the 
actual authority rule, this framework provides a workable method for law 
enforcement to elicit cooperation from prosecution witnesses while 
allowing those witnesses to fully understand their rights.8 
Part I examines general background information regarding criminal 
prosecutions, Miranda, and immunity. Part II deconstructs the facts, 
holding, and reasoning in Lilly. Part III compares the Lilly court’s 
reasoning to the general principles of contract law to explain the flaws in 
this assessment. Part III then applies this analysis within Miranda’s 
framework to demonstrate a workable solution to protect the 
constitutional rights of those in the criminal justice system.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda 
Congress vested in United States attorneys the power to prosecute 
crimes.9 The government suggests that these federal prosecutors pursue 
criminal charges against any individual believed to have committed a 
crime.10 In building a case against a suspected criminal, the prosecution 
 
 
5 The actual authority rule in this context requires a government agent to possess the statutory grant 
of power necessary to bind the government to an agreement. See infra II.B. 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 780 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding the fundamental 
fairness exception inapplicable when an agreement did not induce the defendant to confess or 
provide information); see also Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
state agents were not bound by promises made by federal agents, even if appellant detrimentally 
relied on that promise). 
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966). There, the Court found that police must state certain procedural safeguards—
the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the knowledge of the consequences of speaking—
before conducting a custodial interrogation. Id. at 444. 
8 The Supreme Court has said that following the Miranda decision, “the possibility that the person 
under investigation may be unaware of his right to remain silent . . . is implausible.” Brogan v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998) (emphasis added). However, it seems much more plausible 
that a witness may be much less aware of this right. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012).  
10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.220 (1999).  




may elicit cooperation from a witness with information about the 
suspected crime.11 While witnesses for both the prosecution and the 
defense may receive immunity,12 prosecution witnesses have a broader 
right to seek immunity than do defense witnesses13 because the federal 
prosecutor possesses the actual authority to grant immunity.14 When a 
witness cannot testify in a criminal case without self-incriminating, the 
government can grant the witness immunity from prosecution.15 The 
government may grant a witness one of three types of immunity: 
transactional immunity, use immunity, and derivative use immunity.16 
Transactional immunity broadly protects a witness from prosecution for 
criminal activity. 17  Use immunity, on the other hand, protects an 
individual under a more narrow set of circumstances because it only 
prevents a witness’s testimony from becoming the basis of prosecution.18 
However, derivative use immunity slightly expands this basis and 
prevents prosecution based on a witness’s testimony or any fruits of that 
testimony.19 Only derivative use immunity and transactional immunity 
are sufficiently protective to compel a witness to testify without violating 
the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.20  
Without any type of immunity, a prosecution witness must rely on 
her understanding of the Fifth Amendment for protection against self-
incrimination. The Fifth Amendment provides a basic guarantee that no 
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”21 In Miranda, the Supreme Court applied this protection to 
custodial interrogations.22 There, police questioned a suspect without 
first advising him of his constitutional rights, including those provided 
for in the Fifth Amendment.23 Because of the inherent “dignity and 
 
 
11 See id. at 9-27.600 (discussing a prosecutor’s power to enter into non-prosecution agreements 
with such individuals in exchange for cooperation). 
12 See Lipanovich, supra note 2, at 176. 
13 Id. at 175–76. 
14 Robert M. Schoenhaus, Annotation, Prosecutor’s Power to Grant Prosecution Witness Immunity 
from Prosecution, 4 A.L.R.4TH 1221 (1999). 
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012). 
16 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (discussing derivative use 
immunity) State v. Belanger, 146 N.M. 357, 361 (N.M. 2009) (discussing transactional immunity 
and use immunity). 
17 See, e.g., Belanger, 146 N.M. at 361. 
18 Id. 
19 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
20 See id. at 453 (holding that derivative use testimony may compel testimony); see also Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 593–94, 610 (holding that a statute conferring transactional immunity 
sufficiently protected Fifth Amendment interests and could compel testimony).  
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
23 Id. at 456–57. 
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integrity” that the Fifth Amendment protects,24 the Court held that its 
protections apply in custodial interrogation settings.25 
This protection requires that law enforcement advise a suspect of 
the right to remain silent,26 that anything a suspect says “can and will be 
used against the individual in court,”27 and that the suspect has the right 
to have an attorney present.28 The Court noted that a failure to provide 
such a warning “would discriminate against the defendant who does not 
know his rights. . . . To require the [defendant to make the] request 
would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had 
fortuitously prompted him to make it.” 29  This privilege “is so 
fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that it requires an 
affirmative warning in every case, even if the individual already knew of 
his or her rights.30 The best method to ensure that the individual may 
fully exercise his or her rights31 is to provide affirmative warnings in 
every interrogation.32 Despite this extremely favorable analysis of Fifth 
Amendment rights, law enforcement officers need not provide such 
affirmative warnings when interviewing a prosecution witness.33 This 
disconnect exists despite the fact that the same rights at stake during a 
custodial interrogation may be implicated when a prosecution witness 
speaks to law enforcement. 
B. The Actual Authority Rule 
A government entity must have the authority to grant immunity for 
the individual to enforce an immunity agreement.34 This authority may 
be either express or implied.35 A federal prosecutor’s authority is express 
because federal statutes enumerate the power and its scope.36 Other 
government agents may have implied authority to act on behalf of the 
 
 
24 Id. at 460. 
25 Id. at 461. 
26 Id. at 467–68. 
27 Id. at 469. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369–370 (Cal. 1965). 
30 Id. at 468. 
31 Id. at 469 (noting that “a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its 
pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in 
time”) (emphasis added). 
32 Id. at 472. 
33 Id. at 444 (holding that such requirements apply only during custodial interrogations). 
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
35 United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2000). 
36 See id. (holding that “a government agent possesses express authority to bind the government if—
and only if—the Constitution, a federal statute, or a duly promulgated regulation grants such 
authority in clear and unequivocal terms”). 




government “when that act is integral to the tasks assigned to him or 
otherwise necessary for the due accomplishment of those tasks.”37 
Regardless of whether a government entity possesses the express or 
implied power to act, the entity must possess the actual authority to bind 
the government in agreements with individuals.38 If an individual seeking 
to enforce a promise made on behalf of the government can demonstrate 
that the government actor possessed the legal authority to make a 
promise at that time, then the government must fulfill that promise.39 As 
applied to immunity, the rule strictly limits enforceable promises to 
prevent perpetrators of especially terrible crimes from going unpunished 
because a government agent made a promise that seemed advantageous 
in the moment. 40  Whereas apparent authority may suffice in some 
instances,41 immunity agreements require actual authority.42 
The power to grant immunity rests entirely at a prosecutor’s 
discretion.43 This discretion allows the government to selectively honor 
an agreement with a prosecution witness, even though such a notion 
violates basic ideas of fairness.44 An individual may not enforce all 
promises made between the individual and a government entity.45 This 
policy shifts the risk of an unenforceable agreement onto the individual.46 
This general rule and its policy justification give way to one limited 
exception. A United States attorney must fulfill promises made by other 
government entities, even if the entity made the promise without the 
actual authority to do so, if “breach of the agreement [would] render[] a 




38 Id. (citations omitted).  
39 Id. at 84; see also Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing actual authority 
possessed by law enforcement to enforce promises made during plea agreements). 
40Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that 
“otherwise, a minor government functionary hidden in the recesses of an obscure department would 
have the power to prevent the prosecution of a most heinous criminal simply by promising immunity 
in return for the performance of some act which might benefit his department”). 
41 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990) (justifying a search under the Fourth 
Amendment based on an individual’s apparent authority over the dwelling by stating that “the 
government [need not] be factually correct in its assessment” of the situation in order to be deemed 
to have acted reasonably). 
42 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
43 See generally United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir 1995).  
44 It seems fair to bind parties to the promises they make. This idea, known as promissory estoppel, 
dominates contract law. See infra III.A.2. 
45 Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (holding that government entities are 
not subject to promissory estoppel considerations); see also United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 
1191 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that promises made by a government employee regarding 
criminal charges may not always bind the United States Attorney to honoring that promise).  
46 Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 384. 
47 United States v. Williams, 780 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Rodman, 519 
F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam)). 
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standard appears broad and subjective, courts construe it narrowly.48 This 
narrow interpretation prevents the exception from “swallow[ing] the 
rule” and becoming more powerful than the actual authority rule.49 
Government actors may therefore act unfairly and remain unbound to 
promises because the particular situation may not fit within this narrow 
exception.50 
C. Scope of the Rule and Exception 
By requiring a government entity to possess the actual authority to 
grant immunity, the government can prosecute more crimes.51The actual 
authority rule extends this power to prosecutors as a function of their role 
in the executive branch in furtherance of their duty to faithfully execute 
federal laws.52 This discretionary power allows a prosecutor to determine 
whether to pursue a criminal case against an individual. Courts largely 
cannot review this discretionary power, 53  so the actual authority 
requirement for immunity simplifies the process by explicitly granting it 
to a certain class of government actors. 
Courts rationalize the fundamental fairness exception in a similar 
fashion. Courts construe the fundamental fairness exception narrowly to 
avoid making it broader than the rule. 54  A narrow exception to a 
generally broad rule necessarily results in fewer instances for witnesses 
to utilize it. This rationale likewise reduces the number of grants of 
immunity and therefore increases the number of individuals prosecuted. 
This notion fits with the general grant of power to United States 
attorneys to prosecute “all offenses against the United States.”55 Thus, 
the actual authority requirement to grant criminal immunity limited by 
the narrow fundamental fairness exception mirrors the broad grant of 
power to prosecute federal crimes limited only by a narrow exception. 
The Tenth Circuit treats immunity agreements of any kind like plea 
agreements in terms of the scope of the rights they confer.56 However, 
most discussion related to witness immunity in the Tenth Circuit focuses 
 
 
48 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Woods, 743 F.3d 689, 699 (10th Cir. 2014). 
49 Id. (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 530 (2009)). 
50 See United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing typical examples of 
failed attempts to utilize the fundamental fairness exception). 
51 See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1236–37 (5th Cir. 1979). 
52 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1965). 
53 Id. at 190. 
54 See, e.g., Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 530 (discussing the need to construe the exception narrowly to 
ensure it does not “swallow the rule”). 
55 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012). 
56 See United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2016) (calling the context of plea 
agreements “analogous”) (citing United States v. Pinter, 971 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that “the same analysis applies to both” plea agreements and immunity agreements)).  




on various aspects of federalism57 or prosecutorial misconduct58 without 
much analysis of the actual authority rule.59 Much of the analysis appears 
to accept this rule and view skeptically any attempt to raise the 
fundamental fairness exception.60 Indeed, the reasoning generally relies 
heavily on canons of narrow interpretation of exceptions to rules rather 
than analyzing the context in which those rules apply.61  
II. UNITED STATES V. LILLY 
A. Facts 
United States v. Lilly demonstrates how this rule and exception 
work in a typical, “mine-run” case.62 Defendant Janet Lilly spoke with 
federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in connection with her 
fiancé’s arrest for methamphetamine possession.63 She then spoke to 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agents, who work for 
the state of Wyoming, about her involvement in methamphetamine 
distribution.64 During this discussion, Ms. Lilly incriminated herself in 
her fiancé’s methamphetamine operation.65 The DCI agents assured Ms. 
Lilly that they would help her and that they would do their best to ensure 
the government would not prosecute her based on her testimony.66 Based 
on these suggestive statements, Ms. Lilly believed that she would receive 
immunity from prosecution.67 
Ms. Lilly attended other meetings with both federal DEA agents and 
state DCI agents.68 While Ms. Lilly discussed her cooperation with the 
state agents, she never discussed immunity with federal agents.69 Ms. 
Lilly did not engage a lawyer until after several meetings with DCI 
 
 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that an agreement 
with state officials cannot bind a federal prosecutor); United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 484 
(10th Cir. 1978). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1031 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose whether any prosecution witnesses will receive immunity for their 
testimony). 
59 See United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir 1995) (noting that the prosecutor had 
made promises to the defendant and therefore must fulfill those promises because that particular 
government actor had the actual authority to make the promises). 
60 See Lilly, 810 F.3d at 1216 (stating that this exception would not apply, even if Ms. Lilly could 
prove that the law enforcement officers had promised her immunity). 
61 Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Durango v. Woods, 743 F.3d 689, 699 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
62 Id. (classifying Ms. Lilly’s case as “mine-run,” or a typical example of how a witness-turned-
defendant may attempt to utilize the exception to the actual authority rule). 
63 Id. at 1208. 
64 Id. 




69 Id.  
8 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
 
agents.70 But during these meetings, both Ms. Lilly and her lawyer 
believed that the DCI agents’ actions implied that Ms. Lilly would 
receive immunity from federal prosecution.71 However, nearly two years 
following her initial questioning, a grand jury indicted Ms. Lilly on 
federal drug charges related to her fiancé’s operation.72 
B. Procedure 
At trial, Ms. Lilly moved to dismiss the charges.73 The district court 
reasoned that because the DCI agents do not possess the actual authority 
to promise her immunity, the government need not provide her with 
immunity.74 Based on this finding, Ms. Lilly accepted a conditional plea 
agreement and appealed the denial.75 The judge sentenced Ms. Lilly to 
eighty-seven months in prison and four years of supervised release.76 
On appeal, Ms. Lilly raises a factual issue based on her 
conversations with the DCI and DEA agents and a legal issue related to 
the actual authority that agents from either agency possessed at the time 
they spoke to her.77 Noting that the authority to investigate crimes does 
not imply the authority to authorize immunity,78 the Tenth Circuit upheld 
Ms. Lilly’s conviction because none of the agents who spoke to Ms. Lilly 
possessed the actual authority to promise her immunity.79 For the Tenth 
Circuit, this holding ended the inquiry.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
Ms. Lilly’s case demonstrates the issues related to immunity from 
prosecution in federal criminal cases. Because the legal inquiry focuses 
solely on the actual authority a government entity possesses at the time 
of the discussion, it does not protect against the potential for persuasive 
suggestions by law enforcement agents. As Ms. Lilly’s case shows, 
suggestions for cooperation can be easily misinterpreted to convey a 
grant of immunity. This causes the individual to essentially self-
 
 
70 Id. at 1208–09. 




75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1210. 
78 Id. at 1213. 
79 Id. at 1210. 
80 Id. at 1219. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit stated that even assuming the DCI agents did promise her 
immunity, she could not receive it because the agents did not possess the legal authority to make the 
promise. Id. at 1210. 




incriminate without Fifth Amendment protections that would provide 
protection at later stages in a criminal prosecution.81  
The individual unfairly bears the risk in this kind of encounter when 
his or her constitutional rights could be at stake. This kind of burden 
demonstrates the unfairness in comparing agreements for immunity with 
concepts in contract law. To better shift the risk and ensure that 
constitutional rights receive proper protection, the Tenth Circuit should 
consider adopting a Miranda-style approach to encounters with potential 
prosecution witnesses. A Miranda-type warning would ensure that 
individuals understand that an agent cannot promise to immunize a 
witness in exchange for testimony in another case because law 
enforcement would have to inform the witness of an agent’s inability to 
grant immunity unless the agent has the actual authority to do so. This 
type of protection would leave intact the actual authority rule while 
preserving the narrow interpretation of the fundamental fairness 
exception. 
A. Flawed Comparison to Contract Law 
Agreements to grant immunity to prosecution witnesses are often 
compared to contractual relationships. In many ways, the two exchanges 
appear similar: two parties with individual interests seize an opportunity 
for cooperation to provide a service in exchange for more valuable 
consideration. However, this comparison oversimplifies the nature of the 
rights at stake in both exchanges, ignores the difference in enforceability 
in the two types of agreements, and fails to take into account the 
remedies available for breach in both situations. In particular, contract 
law does not so strictly contemplate elements of fairness in the way that 
constitutional law does.82 Because of the more serious rights at stake in 
immunity agreements, the argument focusing on promissory estoppel 
holds little weight compared to the notions of fairness that favor 
expanding the fundamental fairness exception.83 Even though contract 
law would not produce a remedy for an aggrieved individual, a right may 
still have been violated and therefore relief may be required.84 But, as it 
currently stands, the law affords no relief. 
1. The Nature of the Rights at Stake  
First, immunity agreements for prosecution witness immunity 
implicate much more serious consequences than do contractual 
 
 
81 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (noting, for example, that a defendant 
“must be counseled, absent a waiver” when accepting a plea deal, indicating the serious nature of the 
rights at stake).  
82 See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979). 
83 See id. at 15–16. 
84 See id. at 16. 
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agreements. While parties can contract for nearly any good or service,85 
these kinds of bargains do not implicate the same fundamental rights that 
a potential criminal proceeding might. Contractual disputes primarily 
implicate monetary 86  and property 87  interests. These interests, while 
worthy of protection,88 do not implicate fundamental rights in the same 
way that a potential immunity agreement does. A prosecution witness 
providing information in a case could implicate the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.89  
While immunity agreements bear elements of contract law, they are 
primarily governed by constitutional law.90 Decisions made pursuant to 
constitutional rights “cannot be made to turn in favor of the government 
on the fortuities of communications or on a refusal to accord any 
substantive value to reasonably induced expectations that government 
will honor its firmly advanced proposals.” 91  This constitutional 
protection “reflects . . . our fundamental values and aspirations, and 
marks an important advance in the development of our liberty.” 92 
Contract law embodies a much less profound purpose—to understand 
and enforce agreements between parties. 93  These differing purposes 
reflect the difference in the importance of the two concepts. While 
contractual disputes may be complex in nature and affect important 
aspects of an individual’s livelihood,94 no contractual agreement could so 
profoundly affect a person’s interest in liberty. 95  The comparison 
between immunity agreements and contract law fails to consider the 
profound nature of the rights implicated in the immunity discussion. It 
would oversimplify the nature of these rights to compare them to 
disputes over goods or services. 
 
 
85 But see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (stating that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States,” thereby prohibiting a party from contracting away his or her liberty to a private 
individual). 
86 See infra III.A.3. This discussion points out that monetary damages are a common remedy for 
breach of contract, thereby monetizing the interests at stake. 
87 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 125 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (discussing 
special contractual concerns for agreements to buy or sell land). 
88 See, e.g., id. § 110 (requiring certain types of contracts to be in writing, thereby providing extra 
protection for those particular interests). 
89 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (discussing why the Fifth 
Amendment may limit a prosecutor’s ability to compel testimony). 
90 See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979). 
91 Id. 
92 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444. 
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1)–(2) (discussing the manner in which to 
determine the parties’ intent in an agreement as a method of enforcing such an agreement). 
94 For example, an employment contract dispute could hind an individual’s ability to earn a living. 
This concern undoubtedly reflects the importance of such contracts in protecting workers’ interests. 
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, supra note 81. 




While an agreement to testify on behalf of the prosecution bears 
similarities to an agreement to perform a service in exchange for 
consideration, the immunity agreement reflects consideration of much 
more substantial rights. The consideration in this instance, remaining free 
from prosecution, involves the right to liberty. This right profoundly 
reflects important, foundational ideals. 96  While property rights are 
subject to much discussion, they are much less inherent.97 At a minimum, 
these property rights are not “self-evident” in the way that the right to 
liberty is.98  Based on this inherent notion, the rights at stake in a 
discussion of immunity are much more powerful than the rights protected 
by contract law. 
2. Promissory Estoppel and Enforceability  
Second, contract law includes a built-in safeguard that promises of 
immunity do not have. Contract law allows for promissory estoppel 
which can require enforcement of a contract that lacks consideration 
when a party reasonably and foreseeably relies on the agreement.99 
However, promissory estoppel cannot bind the government in most 
circumstances.100 Without this safeguard, individuals entering into an 
agreement with the government bear the risk that the government cannot 
or will not fulfill its promise.101 
This risk-bearing rationale creates a simple rule with a simple 
justification that courts can easily apply. However, this reasoning does 
not account for the fundamental unfairness in shifting such a large risk to 
such a relatively powerless individual. Without a promissory estoppel-
type method of enforcement, individuals may make agreements that lead 
them to believe an entity possesses the authority to help him or her avoid 
prosecution. While providing a service to the government by agreeing to 
furnish testimony to aid in a different criminal case, the individual 
additionally could feel compelled to answer in a self-incriminatory 
manner. 
Choosing to exercise the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination may fail for several reasons in this situation. Most 
importantly, an individual must affirmatively invoke it in order to receive 
 
 
96 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating “that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness) (emphasis added). 
97 But see JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18–19 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1690) (arguing for the inherent nature of property rights, but only after 
an individual has invested time and labor into that property). 
98 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 92. 
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
100 Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (holding that government entities are 
not subject to promissory estoppel considerations). 
101 Id. 
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its protections.102 But without the knowledge of this right or of its 
applicability in the current situation, the individual could not invoke it. 
While courts have not found incrimination based on a lack of knowledge 
to constitute a compelled confession within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment,103 such is the effect.  
Without the knowledge that the Fifth Amendment may protect an 
individual in an interaction with law enforcement related to a different 
suspect, an individual may act in reliance on promises made by law 
enforcement designed to induce cooperation. Without the knowledge that 
the right against self-incrimination must be affirmatively exercised, an 
individual could admit to criminal wrongdoing when aiding the 
government in another case based on the expectation that such testimony 
would not lead to prosecution. Because the individual is helping the 
government, it seems reasonable that the government would offer 
immunity in exchange for the individual’s testimony. It seems 
fundamentally unfair to punish an individual for acting off his or her 
limited knowledge while allowing the government to essentially compel 
incriminating testimony from an individual who provides information in 
another case. Whereas contract law could allow for enforceability based 
on this reliance, immunity agreements afford no such benefit to 
aggrieved individuals.  
3. Remedies for Breach  
Third, the remedies for a breach of contract are much more 
extensive than the remedies that may result from a breach of immunity 
agreement. Remedies for breach of contract are generally available in the 
case of breach by the other party.104 Even when the breach did not result 
in any net loss, the aggrieved party may still receive damages.105 Indeed, 
“[e]very breach of contract gives the injured party a right to damages 
against the party in breach,” except for a select few limited 
circumstances.106 
In contrast, the only potential avenue for relief under the actual 
authority rule comes from the fundamental fairness exception. However, 
this narrow exception is functionally unavailable in all but the most 
serious cases.107 Courts construe the fundamental fairness too narrowly to 
 
 
102 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (noting that the police’s failure to 
inform defendant of his rights was “certainly [a] factor[] to be evaluated in assessing the 
‘voluntariness’ of an accused's responses,” it was not “determinative”) (citations omitted). 
103 See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1976). 
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346. 
105 See id. § 346(1). 
106 Id. § 346 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
107 United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussion the inapplicability of 
the fundamental fairness exception in “mine-run” cases). 




provide an adequate remedy for aggrieved individuals in immunity 
agreements. This potential threat to a constitutionally protected right 
should not “be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency.”108 
While a prosecutor’s power to file criminal charges and grant immunity 
mirror each other in its broad scope, this similarity should not guide how 
courts apply the rules relating to immunity. 
The same logic applies to the fundamental fairness exception. The 
requirement of actual authority, applied literally, creates the potential for 
abuse and prohibits courts from addressing that abuse except in the most 
egregious cases. The fundamental fairness exception permits law 
enforcement to suggest or promise immunity for a witness while 
allowing the government to simultaneously build a case against that 
witness. Such a result surely increases the number of crimes prosecuted, 
but also undoubtedly elicits admissions of guilt from individuals who 
might otherwise choose to speak differently. The government should 
shift focus from increasing the number of prosecutions to the principles 
of fairness that govern the constitutional rights potentially threatened by 
an overly broad rule with one limited and nearly unworkable exception. 
B. Balancing the Relative Interests—A Miranda Comparison  
The law should bind the government to promises that a reasonable 
person would believe to constitute offers of immunity. This analysis 
would simply require weighing the relative burdens on the government 
and on the individual.109 Balancing the relative interests would expand 
the exception to the requirement of actual authority and honor 
agreements that more adversely affect a defendant than positively benefit 
the government. One potential solution imposes a Miranda-style 
affirmative warning before questioning a potential prosecution witness to 
ensure that police act reasonably in questioning prosecution witnesses. 
Such a warning would fully inform witnesses of their rights while also 
informing them that a law enforcement officer could not grant them 
immunity. Additionally, such a warning would likely not affect the 
number of witnesses who provide information, even potentially 




108 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (discussing Fourth Amendment rights). 
109 See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979). 
110 See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. 
CT. REV. 153, 205 (noting that “we comply with the police not because we make a deliberate 
conscious choice to respond in a particular way, but rather because we mindlessly respond in a 
manner consistent with social roles”). 
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While immunity bargaining stages do not constitutionally require 
due process,111 extending the requirement to act reasonably at this stage 
would benefit both parties. While rights do not vest in a defendant until 
an authorized party makes the official decision to offer a deal in 
exchange for an individual’s testimony,112 reckless admission of criminal 
wrongdoing can hamper an individual’s ability to receive immunity for 
testimony related to that activity.113 But it may remain unclear as to at 
what point an understanding of immunity or an agreement not to pursue 
criminal charges against an individual arises. Individuals likely do not 
know that law enforcement officials do not have the actual authority to 
confer immunity. 114  Therefore, if law enforcement encourages an 
individual to talk to them and that interaction creates a risk that an 
individual may make incriminating statements, then the law should 
require law enforcement agents to provide an affirmative warning about 
their inability to grant immunity.  
Witnesses for the prosecution, unlike witnesses for the defense, 
typically help the government make its case against another individual. 
This benefit the government receives lacks an element of symmetrical 
fairness if an individual can face prosecution based on the same 
testimony that helped the government. It seems even more unfair that this 
result could occur simply because an individual did not know of his or 
her Fifth Amendment rights and the scope of those rights. Requiring law 
enforcement officers to make an affirmative and formal statement 
dispelling any notion that they may have the authority to grant immunity 
in a federal investigation would create a more symmetrical element of 
fairness. Indeed, the Miranda Court commented on this element of 
fairness when it stated:  
Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of 
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning 
as to the availability of the privilege so simple, [that] we will not 
pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware 
of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the 
knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his 
age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can 
never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.115 
 
 
111 Cooper, 594 F.2d at 19–20 (noting that due process considerations must only factor into the 
discussion at the plea bargaining stage). 
112 Id. 
113 United States v. Costello, 750 F.2d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1984). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 810 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that both Ms. Lilly 
and her attorney believed the law enforcement officials would take steps to ensure she received 
immunity for her testimony against her fiancé). 
115 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966).  




Any slight promise of immunity or some other benefit given to induce a 
confession or testimony cannot be accepted.116  
Even though individuals bear the risk in government interactions,117 
the government can bear the risks of miscommunication better than an 
individual. However, the same principle applies when the government 
actor does not understand the extent of the government’s authority in the 
situation. 118  While such knowledge may be publicly available, 
suggestions by law enforcement officers to individuals who may have 
committed crimes can be very powerful. An individual could reasonably 
construe a law enforcement agent’s encouragement cooperation as a 
promise not to pursue criminal charges based on the content of that 
statement. To avoid this risk of potentially inducing a confession as part 
of a tactic to elicit information, the government should bear the burden of 
providing individuals with actual knowledge of the bounds of its 
authority when such interactions could reasonably implicate protections 
against self-incrimination.119 
On its face, this suggestion seems as though it would lead to a 
decrease in cooperation between prosecution witnesses and law 
enforcement. However, empirical data of similar situations indicates that 
such affirmative warnings do not significantly alter an individual’s 
willingness to cooperate.120 When law enforcement informs individuals 
of their right in a certain situation, individuals still fully cooperated.121 
On its face, this result seems to indicate that informing individuals of 
their rights does not matter. But this conclusion does not recognize the 
importance of informing individuals of their rights as a prerequisite to 
exercising them. The Miranda Court noted that individuals who do not 
know of their rights cannot exercise them.122 Indeed the very act by law 
enforcement officers of informing prosecution witnesses that the officer 
cannot promise immunity to the witness recognizes these important 
 
 
116 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1987) (finding “any direct or implied promise, 
however slight” to be intolerable). 
117 Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). 
118 Id. 
119 See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 20 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that requiring signatures 
from individuals is a “simple and obvious precaution” that the government can take when entering 
into agreements). 
120 See Nadler, supra note 106 (collecting data regarding individuals who consent to police 
searches). 
121 Id. (finding no change in cooperation in a study of Ohio law enforcement officers who advised 
motorists of their right to refuse consensual searches).  
122 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (noting that requiring individuals to affirmatively 
exercise their rights without confirming that they are aware of those rights “would be to favor the 
defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him” to do so). 
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rights and further promotes the importance of these rights conferred in 
Miranda.123 
While a discussion with a prosecution witness may not feel as 
coercive as a custodial interrogation, the process can potentially 
implicate the same rights. For example, even though law enforcement 
officers interviewed Ms. Lilly in her home, they still made statements 
suggesting that full cooperation would lead to a grant of immunity.124 
These statements led to her self-incrimination.125 While this situation 
does not appear as coercive as the interrogation in Miranda,126 it still 
implicates the same constitutional protections. An affirmative warning 
would at least advise witnesses, like Ms. Lilly, that their statements are 
not immune from prosecution. This warning likely would not change 
how an individual interacts with law enforcement, but it provides 
valuable information to an individual who might not otherwise know of 
the rules regarding witness immunity. Because an affirmative warning 
would recognize the important rights at stake, inform individuals of these 
rights, and likely would not affect witness cooperation, such a warning 
would best protect witnesses from self-incrimination. 
The government should bear this burden of providing a warning 
because individual interests in protection from self-incrimination 
outweigh the burden of disclosing additional information. Additionally, 
the government benefits from these individuals who provide information 
to help prosecute another case. One individual’s statement can provide 
invaluable information without which the government could not 
prosecute a case against another individual. For the same reason, society 
as a whole also benefits from this exchange between a prosecution 
witness and law enforcement. The support provided by prosecution 
witnesses helps to secure convictions in other, more serious cases. 
This consideration weighs much more strongly against the 
government’s interest in prosecuting all crimes and balances nicely with 
the broad discretion afforded to prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials. Additionally, an affirmative warning recognizes the 
fundamental nature of the rights provided for in the Fifth Amendment 
and allows individuals to make an informed decision about what they say 
 
 
123 While Nadler, supra note 106, focuses on exercise of Fourth Amendment rights to refuse 
searches, the same logic applies in the Fifth Amendment context given the Miranda court’s focus on 
the fundamental nature of Fifth Amendment rights.  
124 United States v. Lilly, 810F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2016). The court noted that even if Ms. 
Lilly could prove that government agents affirmatively promised her immunity, her claim would still 
fail because the agents lacked the actual authority to grant her immunity. Id. at 1212. 
125 Id. at 1208. 
126 Compare Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966) (noting that law enforcement interrogated 
Mr. Miranda in a special interrogation room at the police station after arresting him) with Lilly, 810 
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to law enforcement. Any burden an affirmative warning requirement 
would place on law enforcement, prosecutors, or society127 would be 
minimal compared to the benefit afforded to witnesses who might 
otherwise receive no protection for their right against self-incrimination. 
This balancing consideration warrants expanding the fundamental 
fairness exception to include instances when police officers do not 
affirmatively dispel their lack of actual authority to grant immunity to 
prosecution witnesses. If the government receives such a large benefit 
from individual statements given by witnesses for the prosecution, then 
the extension of immunity or an agreement not to prosecute based on the 
content of that statement is a fair way to both prosecute important cases 
and protect individuals and encourage them to aid the prosecution when 
possible. By implicating the idea of fundamental fairness before 
constitutional rights are even at stake, the actual authority rule becomes 
much more flexible and responsive to the practical realities of 
prosecution witnesses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the actual authority rule for immunity is unworkably 
broad. The fundamental fairness exception to the rule is likewise 
unworkably narrow. Both the rule and the exception lead to situations 
like that in Lilly where an individual may be charged with a crime 
because the government officials promising her immunity simply did not 
have the statutory grant of power required to fulfill that promise. Such a 
hard and fast rule ignores the practical implications of securing 
cooperation from a witness for the prosecution. Additional protections 
can be taken to preserve the general rule and the exception while 
recognizing the realities of the modern criminal justice system. 
Such a protection, like providing a Miranda-style warning before 
interviewing witnesses, recognizes the importance of these rights. The 
discussion surrounding these rights analogizes them more to contract law 
than to Miranda and other Fifth Amendment cases. However, these 
comparisons fail because contract law cannot provide adequate 
protection for these constitutional rights. A Miranda-style warning 
provides a simple and effective way to inform individuals of their rights 




127 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishing Small 
Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 509–10 (1996) (noting that the affirmative requirements 
imposed on law enforcement by Miranda have had seemingly no impact on confessions obtained 
during interrogation, indicating that any burden placed on law enforcement is minimal compared to 
the result). 
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